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Abstract 
 
Bulgaria follows a currency board tied to the euro. The analysis of the effects that adopting 
the euro might have on its export sector is crucial for Bulgaria and other similar Eastern 
European countries. Bulgaria, a middle-income country has now more multi-product firms 
(MPFs) than single-product firms (SPFs). Thus, MPFs is not only a characteristic of only 
high-income countries. The contribution of adding and dropping products within a single 
firm is important to the export sector and the aggregate economy. MPFs benefit from 
exporting to EU markets by becoming more productive and encouraged to exporting more 
product varieties while beating down the costs of producing these new varieties and the 
cannibalization effect. These MPFs might be in advantage as a result of facing lower 
exchange rate costs and being better exposed to the acquisition of know-how and technology 
from participating in EU markets. MPFs cut their product diversity only to non-EU countries 
to keep core competence and in response to adverse changes in the exchange rate. 
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1. Introduction 
The impacts of exchange rate movements on trade flows at the country level or firm level 
have been widely analyzed for highly developed countries. Much fewer such studies however 
exist for emerging and developing countries. In addition, earlier empirical work analyzing the 
exporter behavior in response to exchange rate variations has used plant or single-product-
firm data. The literature on international trade has however recently provided evidence that 
countries have significant number of firms that export not only multiple products but also 
large number of products to multiple destinations. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) have 
found that around one half of surviving U.S. firms add and/or drop products from their 
existing range every five years, and the contribution of the added and dropped products to 
aggregate output is of around the same magnitude as the contribution of firm entry and exit. 
So far very little has been done in the literature to analyze the role that exchange rate 
variations play in the internal organization of the firm, namely its optimal export price setting 
of each variety, its choice of the export volume of each variety, its choice of product 
varieties, and how these factors interrelate with each other. One of our contributions to the 
literature here is to carry out such analysis both theoretically and empirically. This multi-
product feature in the data has recently led to the development of theoretical studies which 
move beyond the analysis of the inter-firm dynamics such as those of Neary and Eckel 
(2010); Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik and Neary (2010); Arkolakis and Muendler (2011); 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) and Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014). There are a 
couple of empirical studies considering the case of multi-product firms which are very close 
to our paper. We have the work of Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) who study how the 
productivity of French firms influences the effect that variations in the real exchange rate 
have on export prices and volumes, and on the firm possibilities to participate in international 
trade. They do not emphasize much on intra-firm dynamics. And Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro 
and Vichyanond (2013) find that the effect of real exchange rate variations on export prices 
depends on Brazilian firm’s marginal costs of producing new product varieties.1 
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 In section 2, we explain more extensively these two studies and how our work is related to and different from 
those papers. 
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We contribute to the related literature on several major fronts. Our first contribution, 
modest but perhaps important, is to present an extended version of Neary and Eckel’s (2010) 
Cournot differentiated products model in which we show how real exchange rate variations 
will affect the export volume and price of every product variety. In the same way as Neary 
and Eckel (2010), we consider the “cannibalization effect”, a phenomenon by which MPFs 
make intra-firm adjustments and internalize demand linkages between the varieties they 
produce which are very different from adjustments via exit and entry of firms. We here study 
how this effect, combined with real exchange rate variations, influences volume and prices of 
all product varieties that are exported. We in addition analyse how firms with flexible 
manufacturing, as defined by Neary and Eckel (2010) (see also Milgrom and Roberts (1990); 
Eckel (2009)), that supply additional product varieties outside their core competence, could 
face diseconomies of scope and increasing costs which ultimately affect the volume and price 
of every variety. We seek to determine how real exchange dynamics, cannibalization and 
high costs of product diversification jointly affect the ranges of products supplied for export 
by MPFs. Such effects have not been analyzed before in the relevant literature. 
The second is, using a unique database on firm-level exports for Bulgarian firms, we test 
our theoretical model in order to broaden the standard analysis of inter-firm heterogeneity 
(e.g. with respect to industry, size, product destination, productivity), and instead explore the 
within-firm product heterogeneity. We specifically study the interrelation between the firm’s 
choice of its range of varieties of goods as well as volume and unit values of each of its 
product varieties, and the real exchange rate variations. We should note at the outset that in 
2001 there was more single-product firms (SPFs) than multi-product firms (MPFs), but since 
2004, the number of Bulgarian MPFs has become larger than the number of SPFs, and the 
gap has only been increasing since then. The volume and value of exports have been always 
larger for the MPFs. Thus, MPFs is not a phenomenon of high-income countries but also of a 
country such as Bulgaria with USD 7,500 income per capita in 2013. Third, we study how 
between and within-firm dynamics, i.e. optimal adjustments of their export unit values and 
number of product varieties, depend on the Bulgarian firms’ decisions about whether to serve 
EU markets, Non-EU markets or a combination of both. Our data indicate that the degree of 
market specialization is another important aspect from which Bulgarian multi-product firms 
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differ. We consider the following groups of Bulgarian firms: i) MPFs and Single Product 
Firms (SPFs); ii) MPFs across different industries; iii) MPFs of different sizes; and iv) MPFs 
that export exclusively to EU markets2, solely to Non-EU markets, and to both EU and Non-
EU markets.3 Our study expands the pricing-to-market literature, which has found that 
variations in pricing-to-market behavior across industries and firms are more important than 
variations across destination countries (e.g. Knetter (1993), Feenstra et al. (1996), Atkeson 
and Burstein (2008), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and 
Vichyanond (2013), Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012)). This distinction between EU, and 
Non-EU or combination of the two as destinations is extremely crucial for Bulgaria that has 
signed an EU accession treaty in 2005 and introduced a currency board since 1997 using the 
euro as anchor currency. Our analysis of the Bulgarian export market can be also considered 
as a case study for evaluating possible advantages or disadvantages of adopting the euro if its 
EU accession materializes. One might expect higher productivity and more positive within-
firm adjustments in the Bulgarian export sector through, not only higher export volumes, but 
also increased numbers of product varieties (in MPFs) and more EU country destinations (for 
SPFs in particular), due to reductions in exchange rate transaction costs and risks and other 
benefits that trading with countries in the euro zone bring. This conclusion critically depends 
on whether it is costly for Bulgarian exporters to face uncertainties in the real exchange rates 
with their Non-EU trading partners, and on the costs or benefits that exporting to Non-EU 
countries might entail in comparison to those when exporting to EU countries. 
In our empirical analysis we have an exceptional methodological advantage from the fact 
that Bulgarian monetary authorities currently follow a currency board tied to the euro. This 
implies that we can safely assume that the Bulgarian exchange rate is exogenous relative to 
currencies of countries outside of the euro zone. The possible effects that adopting the euro 
might have on the development and success of its export sector is probably one of the most 
important issues for Bulgaria, and many other similar Eastern European countries, for 
                                                 
2
 Here, the group of EU-countries includes also countries that have adopted the euro as their currency anchor. 
3
 We think it is necessary to group the MPFs according to their choice of the market destinations for their 
exports. The grouping that we here propose allows us to maintain the actual MPFs’ specialization and structure. 
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deciding whether or not to seek to adopt the euro as its currency in the near future. This issue 
should become even more relevant once the European Union successfully resolves its 
ongoing debt crises and takes the necessary measures to avoid further fiscal deficit impasses. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related literature; in section 
3 discusses the data and some stylized facts about the Bulgarian export market; while section 
4 includes our theoretical model. Section 5 presents the empirical model and the estimation 
strategy. Section 6 brings the empirical results; and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The implications of exchange rate volatility for international trade have been extensively 
studied both theoretically and empirically. Much fewer studies though have used firm-level 
data for individual countries to analyze the adjustments that occur between and/or within 
firm-exporters as a result of exchange rate variations especially for exporters in developing 
countries. Important exceptions are for example the works of Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout 
(1995) who consider data from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco; Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
Roberts studied the Colombian case; and the recent work of Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and 
Vichyanond (2013) that analyzes firm-level data from Brazil.  
Our work is closely related to Berthou and Fontagne (2008); Berman, Martin and Mayer 
(2012); and Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013). Berthou and Fontagne (2008) 
analyze the effect of the adoption of the euro, via a reduction in the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate, on the volume of exports and number of varieties per industry. They use firm 
level data for the period 1995-2003 to construct the industry variables. Their empirical work 
indicates that exports activity in the euro zone is driven by the extensive margin (new 
variety) hypothesis of the euro, and that a reduction in the nominal exchange rate volatility 
increases the value of exports by variety (intensive margin). They do not distinguish between 
MPFs and SPFs, and do not analyze the effect of flexible manufacturing and the 
cannibalization effect as we do here. They do not either control for the differences between 
the intra-firm organization and dynamics for firms exporting solely to EU markets, Non-EU 
markets or both markets. 
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Using also firm-level French data, Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) find that high 
performance firms absorb exchange rate movements in their mark-up rates instead of in their 
export volumes, while low performance firms do exactly the opposite. In addition, they find 
that, following a bilateral depreciation, French exporters selling in sectors and countries with 
high distribution costs, choose to increase their mark-ups rather than their export volumes. 
Finally, they find that French firms will try to enter the market fairly quickly after a 
depreciation is experienced (i.e. the extensive margin represents around 20% of the total 
increase in exports), but they pointed out that these firms are small to have a significant 
impact at the aggregate level. Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013) use Brasilian 
data at the firm level and find that when there is an exchange rate depreciation of the 
Brazilian currency, firms increase their product range and raise producer price. In addition, 
they report that the relative position of a product within a firm is a statistically and 
economically significant determinant of firm’s export price responsiveness to real exchange 
rate shocks. Specifically, their results indicate that conditional on the firm’s productivity, the 
increase in producer prices is greater for products closer to the core of competence. 
Our paper differentiates itself from the last two studies in many ways, the most important 
are: i) we study how, depending on the country destination, MPFs’ intra-firm adjustments (of 
prices and product range) can lead to higher productivity after counteracting cannibalization 
effects and the costs of operating with flexible manufacturing, as we defined in the 
introduction; ii) we analyze how the effect of real exchange movements on the volume and 
prices of every variety is influenced by the existence of the cannibalization effect and flexible 
manufacturing; and iii) we emphasize on how MPFs’ internal organization, choice of product 
range and price determination depend strongly on the market destinations they serve through 
trade. We thus broaden their work by analyzing the dynamics of intra-firm adjustments of the 
production line by firms. We analyze the price strategy of MPFs as they move away from 
their core competence as Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013). We however also 
focus on how such relationship between prices and deviations from core competence depends 
crucially on the country destination, industry and firm size. In addition, we study in detail the 
effects on deviating from core competence on the volumes of every variety, and not only on 
prices. Importantly here and in contrast to Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013), 
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we study how cannibalization affects first the export volume and prices of every variety, and 
then the relation between the real exchange rate and quantities and prices of all varieties. In a 
nutshell, throughout our empirical analysis, we differentiate between MPFs and SPFs; 
between MPFs that specialize in different markets: EU and/or Non-EU countries; MPFs by 
size; and MPFs by industry. We measure quantitatively the effect of i) the real exchange rate 
dynamics; ii) rising costs when firms move away from their core competency (i.e. 
diseconomies of scope); and iii) cannibalization that emerge when there is internalization of 
demand linkages between the varieties of goods produced by exporting firms, on export 
volumes of each variety by existing exporters and their export prices.  
There are other very early theoretical works that have studied the role of the exchange 
rate on international trade. Ethier (1973) and Clark (1973) find that if there is uncertainty 
about how the firm’s revenue could be affected by future exchange rates variability, the level 
of trade will be negatively affected by this uncertainty. Clark however concludes that the 
larger the negative covariance between the foreign price and the exchange rate, the smaller 
the negative impact of exchange rate variability on the level of trade. Other well known 
theoretical works relating international trade and exchange rate are the ones of Baldwin 
(1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) whose ideas were later formalized by Dixit 
(1989a,b). They argue that a non-exporter must incur an entry cost to participate in the export 
markets, and this entry cost is sunk. Likewise, an exporter may face fixed costs of shutting 
down. In Dixit’s work, an exporting firm is regarded as owning an option to leave the export 
market, and a non-exporter has an option to enter. Dixit argues that the value of the option is 
influenced not only by the cost of entry and exit but also by the levels of the exchange rate.  
Previous empirical work that have used more disaggregated data (e.g. firm or panel data), 
has focused on the effect of exchange rate changes on the entry and exit decision in export 
markets. The results using these micro data on relationship between export volumes and 
exchange rates are mixed. Campa (1993), and Roberts and Tybout (1997)4 find evidence of 
the existence of sunk costs in entering and exiting the export market which result in sluggish 
                                                 
4
 Campa (1993) uses Spanish data while Roberts and Tybout (1997) have data from Colombia. 
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response of trade flows to exchange rates movements. Campa (2004) uses data from Spain 
and finds that trade adjustments due to changes in the exchange rate levels and volatility 
mainly occur through the adjustment of quantities by existing exporters (intensive margins) 
rather than through changes in the numbers of exporting firms (extensive margins). In 
contrast, Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout (1995) using data from Colombia, Japan, Mexico and 
Morocco find that new exporters were a major factor in explaining the export boom that 
these countries experience in the 1980s. These latter authors argue that the main explanation 
for such booms is the structural and institutional reforms that Colombia, Mexico and 
Morocco underwent, in addition to favorable exchange rate movements (i.e. devaluation of 
their currencies).  
Bernard and Jensen (2001) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) use data for U.S. 
manufacturing plants and find that favorable exchange rate shocks do increase participation 
in exporting (after controlling for entry costs and other forms of intertemporal spillovers, and 
firm characteristics such as size, labor composition, productivity, product mix and ownership 
structure, but also subsidies). Bernard and Jensen (2004) argue that the delay response to the 
dollar depreciation (in mid 80’s) is due to entry (sunk) costs. Greenaway, Kneller and Zhang 
(2007) use firm-level data from a sample of UK manufacturing firms and find strong 
evidence of sunk costs in export markets, and that the exchange rate has little effect on firms’ 
decisions to enter and exit, but have significantly affect export shares. 
Dekle, Jeong and Ryoo (2007) consider a panel data of exporting firms of Japan for the 
period 1982-1997 and find that the estimates of the exchange rate elasticity of exports is 
negative at the firm level.  
 
3. Stylized features of the Bulgarian export market 
The data sources are from the Bulgarian customs for firm-level trade. The original dataset is 
at the quarterly basis and contain transactions-level customs for exports by product at the HS 
nine-digit level but also report the destination of the exports, the value of the exports, and 
volume (in commercial units) for each firm located in the Bulgarian territory. Each firm is 
uniquely recognized by its 13-digit identifier. There are about 1,954,345 exporter-quarter 
observations (or 1,292,945 firm-commodity-country destination quarterly observations). All 
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the numbers presented are in Bulgarian levs (BGN). After eliminating redundancies and 
converting the data into yearly data, we end up with a well organized panel dataset of 
796,687 firm-commodity-country destination yearly observations.  
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show that the total value of exports to the Non-EU countries 
has been not only lower over the years between 2001 and 2006 than the corresponding values 
for firms exporting only to EU countries and values for firms exporting to both EU and 
NonEU countries, but also decreasing. Similar patterns, with slight more variability can be 
seen for the volumes  
            
     
Table 1 shows on the other hand that there is a small difference between the yearly 
mean volume by firms exporting exclusively to EU markets and the yearly mean volume for 
firms exporting only to Non-EU markets, but both of these mean volumes are significantly 
smaller that the volume by firms exporting to both EU and Non-EU markets. The yearly 
average export value of firms specializing in Non-EU markets is only 57% of the average 
value by firms that focus on EU markets, which confirm the patterns shown in Figure (1b) 
  
 
 
9
and (1c). Such low value and volume by firms exporting solely to Non-EU cannot be 
explained by the fact that they are fewer firms because their number is similar to the number 
of firms that specialize in exporting to both EU and Non-EU markets (see Figure 1d). Note 
also in Figure 1d that the number of MPFs focusing in EU markets has been decreasing over 
time, but is still larger than MPFs with other market specializations. Nevertheless, MPFs 
specialists in EU markets have been able to maintain relatively high volumes and values of 
their exports, which might imply that the firms that remain exporting to EU markets are 
likely quite competitive. 
Fact 1.Total volume and value of the exports by MPFs specializing in Non-EU is much 
smaller than their counterparts specializing in EU markets or in both EU and Non-EU 
markets.  
Fact 2. The number of MPFs specializing in EU markets has been decreasing but the levels 
of the export quantities and values of these EU markets have been relatively stable.  
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Figures (2a) and (2b) show the value and volume of both multi-product firms (MPF) 
and single-product firms (SPF). Table 1 indicates that the yearly mean value of export for 
SPFs is 44% of the volume for MPFs. Likewise, the yearly mean volume by SPFs is 57% of 
the corresponding volume for MPFs. The average number of MPFs that exported over the 
period of 2001 to 2006 is similar to the number of SPFs that also exported. See Table 1. 
However, in Figure 3C we notice that the number of SPFs has been decreasing dramatically.  
Fact 3: The number of SPFs has been decreasing dramatically between 2001 and 2006. The 
value and volume of exports have been volatile. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: 2001 - 2006 
 All 
firms 
MPF SPF Firms 
specialized in 
EU+NonEU 
Firms 
specialized 
in EU 
Firms 
specialized 
in NonEU 
Observations: 
Firm-product- 
destination 
796,687 741,456 55,231 512,405 213,493 70,789 
Yearly mean 
value of exports 
123,066 127,978 57,134 153,833 75,687 43,257 
Yearly mean 
volume  of 
exports 
110,866 114,251 65,422 153,593 35,118 30,032 
# 
Exporters/Firms 
97,408 48,715 48,693 20,809 55,424 21,175 
# Products: 
average/max 
5.5/877 10.0/877 1/1    
# Products to 
EU: 
average/max 
   7.3/715 3.6/326  
# Products to 
NonEU: 
average/max 
   5.6/728  3.2/667 
# Country 
destinations: 
average/max 
2.1/64 3.0/64 1.1/40  
 
 
# EU country 
destinations: 
average/max 
   2.8/24 1.2/9  
# NonEU 
country 
destinations: 
average/max 
   2.6/43  1.1/9 
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There are some differences in the number of commodities exported by Bulgarian 
firms over the period of 2001 to 2006. By looking at Figures (3a), (3b) and (3c), we notice 
that firms specializing in both EU and Non-EU markets have exported more commodities 
than firms exporting only to EU markets or only Non-EU markets. Table 1 indicates that a 
few firms that are EU and Non-EU specialists and Non-EU specialists have indeed exported 
a larger number of varieties than EU-specialists. Because of these outliers, over the years 
2001 and 2006, EU specialists exported only 45% and 48% of the maximum number 
varieties exported by firms selling to only Non-EU markets and by firms specializing in both 
EU and Non-EU markets, respectively.  
       
 
 
Figures (4a), (4b) and (4c) and Table 1 show that firms that are EU specialists have 
similar number of country destinations than Non-EU specialists. In contrast, firms 
specializing in exporting to both EU and Non-EU countries have a larger portfolio of 
countries.  
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One of the implications from the data description above is that firms specializing on 
EU markets are likely to be highly productive since they have experience steady increase in 
their value and volume of exports in spite of their declining population, and a moderate 
number of varieties and country destinations. We also noticed that firms specializing in both 
EU and Non-EU markets produce a relatively larger number of varieties (to also a large 
number of country destinations) than their counterparts. We will investigate whether 
exporting more varieties and therefore deviating from their core competency has given higher 
diseconomies of scope and cost for these firms. We have found indeed a significant 
heterogeneity among Bulgarian firms. We will study the implications of this below. 
 
4. Theoretical model 
4.1 Intensive margin, exporter prices and the effect of the exchange rate 
Our theoretical framework to study how real exchange rate shocks affect exporting firms’ 
optimal quantity and price decisions is based on the work of Neary (2009), Neary and Eckel 
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(2010), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2011) who consider 
multi-product firms and heterogeneous firms. Our home country is Bulgaria and assumed to 
have a continuum of industries, each with small number of firms. Factors are mobile within 
each industry, and factor prices are determined at the economy-wide level. Firms are 
modeled as having market power in their own industry but not in the economy as a whole. 
Many of these are multi-product firms and behave strategically against their local rival but 
take income, prices in other sectors and factor prices as given. We assume that firms in 
Bulgaria cannot affect the real exchange rate. 
In our model, Bulgaria exports to different countries whose consumers have each 
preferences defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties of commodities. It is now 
useful to present first the behavior of consumers and then the behavior of MPFs in a single 
industry. 
In the modeling of the behavior of consumers, following Neary and Eckel (2010), it is 
assumed that all consumers in any country destination k to Bulgarian exports have the same 
utility function and each of them maximizes a two-tier utility function that depends on their 
consumption levels q(i,z), in which good i ∈ [1,N(z)]. N(z) is the number of differentiated 
goods (total mass of differentiated goods) produced in the Bulgarian industry z and available 
for consumption. The number of industries varies over the interval [0,1].  
Thus, the Bulgarian economy consists of a continuum of industries, each of which has 
an oligopolistic market structure. There are a finite number of country destinations to 
Bulgarian exports. Consumers in all the country destinations have identical preferences but 
because incomes may differ between countries, consumption levels and marginal utilities will 
be different.  
Each consumer maximizes a two-tier utility function that depends on their 
consumption levels q(i,z) of the N(z) varieties produced in each Bulgarian industry z. The 
upper tier is an additive function of continuum of sub-utility functions, each corresponding to 
one industry: 
1
0
[ { (0, )},..., { ( ( ), )}] { (0, ),..., ( ( ), )}U u q z u q N z z u q z q N z z dz= ∫ .  (1) 
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In the lower tier, the representative consumer in the country destination k is assumed 
to have, for each industry z, an additive function of a continuum of quadratic sub-utility 
functions: 
( ) ( )
2
0 0
2( )
0
1[ (0, ),..., ( ( ), )] ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
2
1 ( , ) .
2
N z N z
N z
u q z q N z z a q i z di b q i z di
b q i z di
ξ
ξ
= − −
 
−  
  
∫ ∫
∫
  (2) 
The utility parameters a, b and ξ are assumed to be identical for all consumers in destination 
country k, denoting the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay, the inverse market size and 
the inverse degree of product differentiation respectively. If ξ = 1, the goods are 
homogeneous (perfect substitutes) so that demand only depends on aggregate output in the 
entire industry. On the other hand, ξ = 0 describes the monopoly case where the demand for 
each good is completely independent of other goods. In this case, consumers give increasing 
weight to the distribution of consumption levels across varieties. We will assume that the 
Lagrange multiplier λ = 1 so that at equilibrium nominal variables are relative to the marginal 
utility of income (see Neary and Eckel (2010)). 
Considering ek as the number of Bulgarian levs per currency of country k, individual 
consumers in the destination country k will maximize utility subject to the budget constraint: 
( )1
0 0
( , ) ( , )
N z
k
p i z q i z di dz I
e
≤∫ ∫ ;    (3) 
where I denotes consumer’s individual income and p(i,z) is the price of this good i in terms of 
Bulgarian levs so that p(i,z)/ek is the price of this good i in terms of the currency in country k. 
From the maximization problem, we derive the individual inverse demand function 
for good of variaty i in industry z by the representative consumer in country destination k: 
( )
0
( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
N z
k
p i z
a b q i z b q i z di
e
λ ξ ξ= − − − ∫ .   (4) 
The parameter λ is the Lagrange multiplier, which denotes the consumer’s marginal utility of 
income.  
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To move from the individual to aggregate demands, we assume that there are L 
consumers located in each of k identical foreign countries. Because the goods markets of all 
countries are completely integrated in a single world market and free trade prevails, the price 
of a given variety is the same everywhere. Therefore, the market demand for a particular 
commodity of variety i in industry z is x(i,z). A Bulgarian firm faces this demand for its 
product i from k country destinations. The total demand from all foreign consumers will be 
υLq(i,z). The inverse world market demand function for good i in the Bulgarian industry z 
can then be rewritten as: 
( , )
' '[(1 ) ( , ) ( )]
k
p i z
a b x i z Y z
e
ξ ξ= − − + ;    (5) 
where ' ; ' .= =λ λυ
a b
a and b
L
 Note however that b’, the slope of the demand function, is 
negatively related to the number of total consumers in the world. 
We can now define the output in an entire industry z in Bulgaria producing 
differentiated goods as: 
0
( ) ( , )
N
Y z x i z di= ∫ .     (6) 
Going now to the representative multi-product firm j in Bulgaria, that produces a 
mass of products denoted by δj, will have profits equal to: 
0
( , ) ( , ) ( )
j
j j j j kp i z c i k x i di F
δ
pi  = − − ∫ ;    (7) 
where Fk is a fixed costs when exporting to country k, and cj(i,k) is the marginal costs of 
producing good i for country k. These marginal costs are constant with respect to the quantity 
produced but differ with varieties and the destination country, e.g. an EU country destination 
versus a Non-EU country destination. This marginal cost will be lowest for the core 
competence variety because it uses the firm’s most efficient production process. The firm can 
produce more varieties as part of its production line via flexible manufacturing which 
describe its ability to produce additional varieties. Nonetheless, the production of more 
varieties requires from the firm some modifications and to incur in higher marginal 
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production costs, even when its marginal production costs of producing existing products 
remain unchanged. Moreover, in our analysis we distinguish between the costs of exporting 
to EU countries and to Non EU countries in light of the facts that trading with the EU 
countries might imply higher competition and therefore higher costs of marketing and quality 
control, stricter regulation. These costs however could be compensated with the reduction in 
transaction costs and exchange rate risk as a result of Bulgaria using the euro as a common 
currency, but also the benefits of being able to acquire technology and knowledge when 
trading with more developed countries as those in the euro zone. 
Marginal production costs for variety i are therefore an increasing function of the 
mass of good varieties produced 
( , )
0j
i
c i k∂
>
∂
; and satisfies 
2
2
( , )
0j
i
c i k∂
>
∂
. 
The market structure in a typical industry, the heterogeneous firms follows a Cournot 
oligopoly so that multi-product and single-product firms compete side by side determining 
simultaneously and strategically their scale and scope of production, assuming that the rivals 
do not change their scale or scope. 
The first-order condition with respect to the scale of production of a particular good i5 
is given by: 
  
( , ) ( , ) '[(1 ) ( , ) ] 0( , ) j j jj
p i z c i k b x i z X
x i z
pi ξ ξ∂ = − − − + =
∂ ;   (8) 
where ( )
j
j j
0
X x i di
δ
= ∫  is the firm j’s aggregate output. The output of a good of a single variety 
can be found by solving (5) and (8) after eliminating the price of good i: 
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Result 1. A depreciation of the Bulgarian lev will increase the production of all varieties. A 
greater product differentiation (smaller ξ) decreases the effect of the exchange rate. 
                                                 
5
 In any given industry z. 
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Result 2. Greater competition (i.e. larger aggregate industry output, Y(z)) leads to lower 
output of variety i at equilibrium. 
Result 3. Given the industry’s and firm j’s total output, this firm j will produce less of each 
variety the further upward it is from its core competence, that is, xj(i) is decreasing in cj(i,k).  
Result 4. Increases in total output by firm j reduces the production of variety i at equilibrium. 
This is the cannibalization effect that could occur when MPFs internalize demand linkages 
between the varieties of goods that they produce in particular when they face competition and 
they are relatively large in their markets. An MPF knows that a larger output of one variety 
would tend to lower the prices that consumers in country k are willing to pay for its other 
varieties. As a consequence, an MPF will have an additional incentive to restrict its output of 
each variety beyond the familiar own-price effect (see Neary and Eckel (2010) for further 
details).  
Result 5. Higher costs reduce the effect of a depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. Notice that for 
a given depreciation, the ratio cj(i,k)/b’(1-ξ)(1+ek) increases as cj(i,k) rises. Such effect 
diminishes the positive effect that depreciations have on the volume of every variety, as 
indicated in Result 1. 
Result 6. Cannibalization reduces the effect of a depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. The 
reasoning here is similar to the one in Result 5. 
Given the symmetric structure of demand, this result should imply that a firm will 
charge higher prices for products that are further from its core competence. We can obtain 
the price equation (10) after using (5) and (8): 
1( ) ' ( , ) ' ( )(1 )j j jk
p i a c i k b Y X
e
ξ = + − − + .                      (10a) 
Result 7. There is a negative effect or real depreciation of the Bulgarian lev onto prices. 
Thus, depreciations make firms more price competitive. 
Result 8. The reduction in the prices that firms can charge in Cournot markets in response to 
real depreciations is partly offset by the cannibalization effect, which encourages MPFs to 
charge higher prices on all their varieties 
We will test these Results for all our firms but we will also analyze if these analytical 
results depend on whether the firm is exporting only to the EU markets, only to the Non-EU, 
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and to both EU and Non-EU markets; its size and the industry they belong to. This is the 
topic of the next section. 
 
5. Empirical work 
5.1 Groups of firms 
We aggregate the quarterly data on exports into yearly basis and analyze it as follows: 
i) All firms 
ii) Multi-Product Firms (MPF) and Single Product Firms (SPF) 
iii) By size: lowest 25 percentile, between 25 – 50 percentile, 50 – 75 percentile, between 
75 – 95 percentile, between 95 – 99 percentile, and between 99 – 99.8 percentile.  
iv) By industry of origin: we chose the ones with the largest export values, SITC6 
(manufacturing goods); SITC7 (machinery and transportation equipment); SITC8 
(miscellaneous manufacturing); SITC0 (food and live animals); SITC5 (chemical 
products); SITC2 (crude materials); and SITC3 (mineral fuels and lubricants). 
v) By country destination: firms that concentrate in exporting to both EU and Non-EU 
countries; firms that only specialize in exporting to EU countries; and a third group of 
firms that only focus in exporting to Non-EU countries. 
 
5.2 The empirical equations 
We here present our empirical relations and the estimation method. 
5.2.1 The fixed effects 
We include the following fixed effects in the estimation of the export supply function 
of variety i to country k by exporter j at time t, qijkt; and the export unit price, pijkt: 
Fixed effect one: A time-fixed effects, τt, that captures the overall evolution of the Bulgarian 
economy like the wage rate, business cycles and other macroeconomic effects. 
Fixed effect two: Firm-commodity-country destination fixed effects is represented by µijk. 
 
5.2.2 The empirical export supply equation 
Define the real exchange rate (RER) between the Bulgaria and country k as RER ≡ (wkek/w) in 
which wk and w are the wage rate in country destination k and in Bulgaria, respectively. After 
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taking into consideration that the marginal costs cj(i,k) can be decomposed into distribution 
costs (units of labor hired in country k which receive a wage equal to wk), and the costs 
(Bulgarian wages and technology expenses) of producing variety i, the export supply of a 
single variety conditional on being an exporter (equation (9)) can be represented by the 
following empirical relation: 
     
1 1 1 1ln ln( ) ln( ) ( , ) ln( ) ln( )ijkt kt kt jt kt jt kt
ijk t ijkt
q RER RER c i k RER X Zα β δ γ
µ τ ϕ
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +
+ +
.     (11) 
In (11), at time t, qijk is the firm j’s export volumes of commodity i to country destination k; 
and φijkt is the error term. The RERkt is the average real exchange rate between Bulgaria and 
country destination k during year t. Note that including RERkt alone allows us to isolate the 
effect of exchange rate risk of exporting to country k, and such effect is also explicit in our 
theoretical specification, equation (9). α is expected to be positive. Xjt is the firm’s aggregate 
production at time t. cjt(i,k) denotes the marginal cost which a typical firm j incurs to produce 
good i. We here use different measures of ci(i,k)t and these are explained below. This cost is 
lowest for the core competence variety, which uses the firm’s most efficient production 
process. The parameters β and δ which according to our model should be negative, measure 
the effects that firm’s marginal cost and total production respectively have on the sensitivity 
of its exported quantity of every variety to the exchange rate. Zkt is a vector of characteristics 
of destination k in year t.  
 We will not test Result 3 because we do not have data on total industry production. 
We think that it would be inaccurate to assume that the production in a given industry is 
determined only by the production of all the firms that export products from that industry. 
We do not have data on how much is produced to the domestic economy. 
 
5.2.3 The empirical unit price (value) of exports equation 
The export unit price function (10) of our theoretical model conditional on being an exporter 
is represented by the following empirical relation: 
1 2 3 4ln ln( ) ln( ) ( , ) ln( ) ln( )ijkt kt kt jt kt jt kt
ijk t ijkt
p RER RER c i k RER X Zα β δ γ
µ τ η
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +
+ +
.        (12) 
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ηijkt is the error term. Prices charged by firms are seldom available in firm-level data, thus, we 
use the unit value of exports of each commodity as a proxy for the price of commodity i in 
terms of Bulgarian lev, and denoted as pijkt. This unit value is computed dividing total sales 
of product i, from firm j, to destination k at time t by the total quantity of product i, from firm 
j, sold to destination k at time t.  
 
5.3 The estimation method and controlling for endogeneity of the regressors 
As mentioned earlier, we can in our empirical analysis safely assume exogeneity of the 
Bulgarian exchange rate with respect to the countries’ currencies outside the euro zone 
because Bulgarian monetary authorities currently follow a currency board tied to the euro. 
However, if this exogeneity assumption of the Bulgarian exchange rate cannot be warranted 
to the extent that the Bulgarian prices are not likely to be harmonized with the prices of the 
country members of European Union and those of countries which have pegged in some way 
to the euro, our estimation method should take this into consideration. 
We are also aware that other explanatory variables could be also expected to be 
endogenous, for this reason, we find the methodology of Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-
Bond (1998) useful when estimating the export supply function. The Arellano-Bover 
(1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimators are dynamic panel estimators 
designed for situations with: 
• Few time periods and many individuals (i.e. exporters); 
• A single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past 
realizations; 
• Independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, that is, they are correlated with 
past and possible current realizations of the error term; 
• Fixed individual effects; and 
• Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across them. 
 
More specifically, we will deal not only with the possibility that the exchange rate and 
the other regressors are endogenous variables but it can be also correlated with the exporter-
commodity-country individual effect, µijk, by using the System GMM suggested by Arellano-
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Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998). Their approach is efficient in dealing with such a 
possible correlation as indicated above. With their approach, instead of just differentiating 
the regressors to cross out our fixed effects (as defined above), it transforms the instruments 
in differences to make them exogenous to the fixed effects or time-invariant variables. This 
allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. Thus, 
in System GMM, one can include time-invariant regressors. 
 
5.4 Construction of variables 
a) The bilateral exchange rate. To calculate the real exchange rate, we obtained data from 
Bloomberg and the Penn World Tables. It is computed as the average yearly (from weekly 
data) nominal exchange rate times the ratio of consumer price indexes. An increase of the 
exchange rate means a depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. 
b) As indicated above, we consider the volume and export unit price for each triplet exporter 
(j) – commodity (i) - country destination (k) at each t. The export unit price is calculated by 
dividing total sales of product i, from firm j, to destination k at time t by the total quantity of 
product i, from firm j sold to destination k at time t.  
c) The GDP for each of the countries are also computed from the Penn World Tables. We 
also control for each country of destination’s GDP (ln(GDPkt)). 
d) Firm’s total exports of all his commodities to all its markets which will serve to estimate 
the cannibalization effect. 
e) We do not have data on the marginal cost which a typical firm j incurs to produce good i, 
cjt(i,k), which the theory defines as being lowest for the core competence variety because the 
firm uses its most efficient production process. We however construct variables as 
approximations to cjt(i,k): 
i) The number of variety-country pairs (number of commodity times countries) to analyze 
the possibility that these costs are not only inherent to firm j exporting commodity i, but 
it also to the country destination. We here distinguish between the pair commodity-EU 
country and the pair of commodity-NonEU country. We should expect the costs and 
competition from participating in the EU markets to be different from those in the Non-
EU markets. 
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ii) The number of varieties. Here, we also make a distinction between the number of 
commodities exported to EU countries and the number of commodities exported to Non-
EU countries. 
iii) The number of varieties that deviate from the firm’s historical average number of 
commodities. Differentiating the case of commodities exported to EU countries from the 
case of commodities exported to Non-EU countries. 
 
6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Estimation of the volume of variety i exported to country k by firm j: All firms, 
MPFs, SPFs, MPFs exporting to EU and/or Non-EU markets 
 
6.1.1 Effects of the real exchange rate 
The exchange rate has the expected effect: a depreciation of the Bulgarian lev encourages a 
greater volume of exports of every product variety and country destination. The only 
exception is for our group of firms that focuses in exporting only to EU markets in which the 
effect is insignificant.6 See Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. Apart from the exception, we confirm Result 
1 of the theoretical model. 
 
6.1.2 Firm j’s marginal cost to produce good i 
We here present the results on how each of our different measures of marginal costs 
reinforces or reduces the effect of the exchange rate on the export volume of each product. 
i) Increases in variety-country pairs (number of varieties times number of countries) 
For our group of firms shown in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, one can notice that a larger number of 
varieties - NonEU countries weaken the effect of a depreciation of the exchange rate, which 
encompasses Result 5. That is, the positive effect that a depreciation of the Bulgarian lev 
have on the supply of exports by firm j of every product variety i to Non-EU countries will 
be weakened if firm j increases not only if its number of varieties but also its number of Non-
                                                 
6
 Notice that when considering EU markets, one should really discuss the effect of changes in relative prices of 
the EU countries and Bulgarian prices. 
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EU countries. Conversely, higher costs of exporting more varieties and to more EU countries 
do not discourage Bulgarian firms to export more varieties to EU countries and countries that 
have adopted the euro as anchor currency. These firms then appear to become more 
productive once they concentrate in exporting to countries where competition is very tough, 
like in the EU. There are certainly some factors that might be sustaining such increase in 
these firms’ productivity: a) better opportunities to acquire more advanced knowledge and 
technology; and b) elimination of exchange rate risk and transaction costs since Bulgaria 
follows a currency board using the euro as anchor currency.  
Note that column 1 in tables 2, 3 and 4 show the results on the effect of increasing the 
number of varieties to all country destinations without distinguishing between EU and Non-
EU countries. We have just shown however that the effect of these costs is not independent 
of the destinations. 
For SPFs, it is only relevant to consider, as representation of their marginal costs, 
how increases in the number of country destinations affect the export volume of each product 
variety. See Table 3. We found that if costs rise as a result of exporting a larger number of 
Non-EU countries, SPFs will be discouraged to export more of all varieties of products. This 
is much in contrast to the effect of increasing the number of EU-country destinations which 
only persuades SPFs to export more of each variety. 
ii) Increases in the number of varieties 
We here make a distinction between the number of varieties exported to EU countries and 
Non-EU countries. Our estimates here indicate that a firm’ decision to export a larger number 
of commodities to Non-EU markets, will induce firms to export less of every variety, which 
confirms our Result 3 from our theoretical model. As firms export more varieties, it will 
become gradually more costly for them continuing producing certain amounts of different 
varieties: qijkt is decreasing in cjt(i,k). As a result, the positive effect of depreciation on the 
volume of exports will be reduced if the number of varieties directed to Non-EU markets 
increases. Result 3 cannot however be corroborated for firms that increase their number of 
varieties to EU markets: higher costs do not restrain Bulgarian firms to export more of every 
variety, even when EU markets are more challenging. And again, this is most likely 
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explained by the economic and technological benefits that exporting to EU countries 
bestows.  
iii) Total number of commodities that deviates from the core competence 
We again find that if a firm produces more varieties and move away from its core 
competence (its average number of varieties), the export volume of each variety will increase 
but only if the country destination is an EU country or a country that uses the euro as anchor 
currency. On the other hand, when the destination is a Non-EU country, our results indicate 
either that, in most cases, there will be a contraction in the export volume of products of each 
variety.  
We can now draw our main first conclusion, independent of the approximation for the 
firm j’ marginal cost of producing more of variety i exported to country k at time t, firm j will 
export less of every variety if it shifts from its core competence by producing more varieties 
and exports these to Non-EU countries. We are then able to confirm our Result 3. 
Nonetheless, since exporting to EU countries seems to bring some benefits which include the 
reduction in exchange rate transaction costs and risks, higher costs from exporting more 
varieties to EU markets do not prevent firms from increasing their export quantities to these 
tough markets. Even SPFs will be persuaded to increase their exports even when they export 
their single product to additional EU countries. EU countries must be gaining from the 
increase in product diversity from Bulgarian MPFs, and as SPFs also are eager to enter new 
EU markets. The opposite occurs if SPFs attempt to increase their number of Non-EU 
country destinations. In addition, the effect of a real depreciation in the Bulgarian lev on the 
volume of each variety will be overridden when the firm moves away from its core of 
competence to sell to Non-EU. This last conclusion is in accordance with the results of our 
theoretical model, Result 5. This is true for our firm groups: all firms, MPFs in general, 
MPFs exporting to both EU and Non-EU markets, and MPFs exporting only to Non-EU 
markets.  
 
6.1.3 Cannibalization effect 
Firm j’s total output Xjt has a negative effect of the output of each variety in all our firm 
groups: all firms, MPFs as a whole, MPFs exporting to both EU and Non-EU markets, and 
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MPFs exporting only to Non-EU markets, except for firms specializing in EU markets, as 
Result 4 predicts. See Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. Thus, when MPFs produce less of every good 
under such circumstances, we say that there is a cannibalization effect. The cannibalization 
effect implies that these firms have a flexible production prototype which strongly depends 
on the country destination and the market specialization of the MPFs. This is because a larger 
output of one variety tends to lower the prices that consumers are willing to pay for all other 
varieties. When MPFs internalize demand linkages between the varieties they produce, MPFs 
will have enough incentives to restrict their output of each variety beyond the familiar own-
price effect. On the other hand, our empirical results also indicate that MPFs exporting 
exclusively to EU markets do not experience such cannibalization effect. They must be then 
producing high quality products as they continue exporting more of all varieties without 
worrying about driving their prices down, even in the tough EU markets. Just recall from 
Fact 1 and Fact 2 from Section 3 which describes the data: the number of exporters 
specializing in EU markets has been decreasing rapidly, but they have they have higher 
volumes of exports. These firms are likely more productive as they produce more of every 
variety not only when they increase their total production in all its varieties, but also when 
they face higher marginal costs. Depreciation of the exchange rate or better to say change in 
relative prices between Bulgarian and foreign prices is not the driving force for these firms to 
have incentive to export more of every variety. We will explain below how prices respond to 
these specific firms’ decision making regarding quantities. Note also that, as our theoretical 
model predicts (Result 6), for our group of firms (except for the EU specialists), 
cannibalization reduces the effect of the real exchange rate on these firms’ quantities. 
 
6.1.4 Robust test of the export-volume equation: firms by size and firms by industry 
Real exchange rate depreciation continues to have a positive effect on the volume of exports 
of every commodity, except for the largest firms as it can be seen in Table 6. This positive 
effect is also remarkably strong and statistically significant for firms from our selected 
Bulgarian industries: the ones with the largest export values. 
Regarding the marginal costs, the results are industry dependent (see Table 7). Thus, we 
could not confirm that firms in all our selected industries are more productive when they 
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export to EU markets. On the contrary, we still find that firms in our considered industries 
will reduce the quantities of all varieties when they move away from their core competence 
to export more varieties to Non-EU markets. There might be then some potential losses as 
firms export fewer varieties to Non-EU countries because of the pressure they have in 
maintaining their core competence and reducing costs.  
Smaller firms too find it too more challenging to export more of every variety in toughest 
markets such as the EU markets, but less demanding to continue exporting more of each 
variety to Non-EU markets even in the presence of higher costs (see Table 6). On the 
contraire, larger firms will be increasing their production of every variety to EU markets 
even as they move away from their core of competence. 
 
6.2 Results on the estimation of the unit price of variety i exported to country k by 
firm : All firms, MPFs, SPFs, MPFs exporting to both EU and/or Non-EU markets 
6.2.1 Effects of the real exchange rate 
SPFs (last column in Table 10) decrease their prices in response to a real depreciation of the 
Bulgarian lev and this corresponds to Result 7 from our theoretical model. All firms of the 
other groups will increase their prices in response to a real depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. 
See Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11. We interpret the result from SPFs as an indication that these firms 
market to price (i.e. lower their prices) to gain a larger share of the market. For the rest of the 
firms, the exporter-producer price elasticity can range between 0.095 and 0.66 which 
corresponds to an exchange rate pass-through between 0.905 and 0.34 before accounting for 
the effect of cannibalization and the marginal costs. As explained below, the net effect of real 
depreciations will be affected by any decisions of the SPFs to increase their number of Non-
EU country destinations for their single exporting good. 
 
6.2.2 The effect of increases in costs  
The exchange rate pass-through to prices is either strengthened or weakened by the marginal 
costs. Moreover, the final effect depends on whether MPFs export their new varieties to EU 
or Non-EU markets. These results can be seen in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11. For example, 
independent of the chosen approximation for marginal costs, all firms (Table 8) and MPFs 
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(Table 9, 10 and 11) will only increase their prices when they produce more varieties of 
goods directed to EU markets, even if that implies higher costs. Such response strengthens, to 
a certain degree, any price increase that results from a depreciation of the Bulgaria lev. This 
will be a natural response by the MPFs (and more so for firms specializing in EU markets) if 
they high quality goods to EU countries. We have indeed found out above that these firms 
are willing to expand their product diversity when exporting to EU countries even when that 
entails moving away from their core of competence and rising costs. From our data 
description in Section 3, we also learned that MPFs that focus in EU markets have higher 
export values that their counterparts even though the number of this type of MPFs have been 
decreasing a deal during our years of study. Conversely, Bulgarian firms (Tables 8, 9, 10 and 
11) that produce more varieties to Non-EU countries (including those that solely export to 
Non-EU countries) will decrease their prices of each of their varieties or leave them 
unchanged. Again, these firms usually reduce the volume of all varieties in response to 
higher costs, and if these firms find it necessary to decrease their prices even when facing 
higher costs, it should imply that these firms must be fighting to keep their market share and 
be forced to decrease their prices to maintain that share. Thus, the effect of higher costs 
offsets the positive effects that Bulgarian depreciations will have on prices. Thus, not all the 
costs of depreciation are passed to Non-EU consumers. 
With respect to the SPFs also, as their number of Non-EU country destinations 
increases, their prices of each variety will increase which might offset the effect of real 
depreciations on prices that exists for these SPFs. In contrast, when these SPFs increase their 
number of EU countries to which they trade, we found that these firms will not alter their 
prices to EU consumers. SPFs may have difficulties to compete in EU markets leaving them 
with fewer possibilities for increasing their prices. They may be seeking to gain a larger 
market share in the EU by absorbing the higher costs themselves. 
 
6.2.3 The cannibalization effect 
We find that prices can decrease as a result of a cannibalization effect. This result 
applies to MPFs considered as a whole, the MPFs that specializes in exporting to both EU 
and Non-EU markets, and those focusing in EU markets. Therefore, cannibalization reduces 
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the positive effect that the exchange rate has on prices, making the degree of exchange rate 
pass-through onto prices smaller than otherwise. This is much in line with our Result 8 of the 
theoretical model. Thus, the high costs of producing additional varieties and the large price 
differentials between Bulgarian prices and foreign prices can be partially offset by the 
cannibalization effect. This cannibalization effect gives these particular firms incentives to 
charge lower price in order to keep probably some market share.  
There is a remarkable distinction from the previous groups, in how cannibalization 
affects prices of MPFs that export fully to Non-EU markets. They charge higher prices on all 
varieties which allow them to earn higher margins in the presence of cannibalization. This 
positive effect of cannibalization will only minimal offset any possible negative correlation 
between the real exchange rate and the producer-exporter price (see last column in Table 11). 
 
7 Conclusions 
We extend the model of Neary and Eckel (2010) by incorporating the exchange rate and use 
it as our analytical framework for our empirical study. We afterward use Bulgarian firm-level 
trade dataset to test our model and analyze the role that the real exchange rate plays in the 
adjustments between and within firms with respect to the volume and price of every variety 
produced by Bulgarian multi-product firms (MPFs). To our knowledge, our paper is the first 
to analyze the role of real exchange rate dynamics, both empirically and theoretically, in the 
spirit of Neary and Eckel’s (2010) model. We have then tried to fill up the gap in the 
literature by highlighting the capabilities of firms from a low-middle income country such as 
Bulgaria, to drive flexible manufacturing and focusing on what Neary and Eckel (2010) have 
called the “intra-firm extensive margin” in response to real exchange rate variability. When 
paying attention to the intra-firm adjustments that occur within Bulgarian MPFs, we find that 
real exchange rate shocks can have considerable impact on Bulgarian exporters’ decisions on 
the price and volume of their different product varieties. Nonetheless, we find heterogeneous 
responses that depend on whether the country destination for the Bulgarian exports is a 
country that is part of the EU or uses the euro as its anchor currency; or a country that is 
outside the EU. Indeed, another objective of this paper was to determine to what degree the 
heterogeneity across Bulgarian MPFs is an important factor in the dynamics within a firm. 
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We subsequently study MPFs in aggregate, according to the industry they belong to and 
according to their size, MPFs that specializes in exporting to both EU markets and Non-EU 
markets, MPFs that solely export to EU markets, and those MPFs that only export to Non-EU 
markets.  
First of all, we find that the exchange rate has the expected effect: a depreciation of the 
Bulgarian lev encourages a greater firm’s volume of exports of every product variety and 
country destination. The only exception is for our group of MPFs that focus on exporting 
only to EU markets for which such effect is insignificant. Thus, the participation of MPFs 
that focus on EU markets does not rely of facing a depreciation domestic currency, or more 
precisely, on a price differential between Bulgaria and other countries since Bulgaria follows 
a currency board regime using the euro as a currency anchor. With regard to export prices, 
firms in all our groups, with the exception of SPFs, increase their prices in response to a real 
depreciation of the Bulgarian lev. SPFs decrease their prices in response to depreciation of 
the Bulgarian lev which probably allows them to gain a larger share in the market. 
Secondly, the effects of flexible manufacturing is disentangle after examining the effect 
on the volume of all varieties of higher marginal costs that result from MPFs moving away 
from their core competence. We conclude that a firm will export less of each variety when it 
increases the number of product varieties that are exported to Non-EU countries. The 
contrary is found when MPFs produce additional new varieties to EU countries or countries 
that use the euro as anchor currency. These MPFs are not discouraged to produce more 
varieties. It is possible that their costs of producing new varieties are counterbalanced with 
the reduction in exchange rate transaction costs and risk that are usually present when 
participating in international trade. Exporting to EU countries might also bring other benefits 
which allow these MPFs to increase their productivity and varieties in spite of higher 
marginal costs. Even SPFs benefit from exporting their single product to additional EU 
countries. Exporting to EU countries indeed increases the productivity of these Bulgarian 
SPFs. The same cannot be said for MPFs that direct their new varieties to Non-EU countries 
or SPFs that decide to export to additional Non-EU countries. Now, regarding export prices, 
MPFs that produced new varieties targeted to EU markets, will tend to increase the prices 
that EU consumers are willing to pay for all new varieties when their marginal costs 
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increases as a result of moving them away from their core competence. These results indicate 
that firms specializing in highly competitive markets such as the EU markets must be 
producing goods which persuade EU consumers to pay higher prices. In contrast, MPFs 
exporting exclusively to Non-EU markets will decrease their prices or leave them unchanged 
in response to higher marginal costs that result from moving away from their core of 
competence. These latter MPFs seem to be competing for market share, costs and prices 
when exporting new varieties to Non-EU markets. On the contrary, MPFs that introduce new 
varieties to EU markets seem to be competing in productivity. 
The exchange rate pass-through to prices is thus affected by increases in the marginal 
costs that result from increasing the number of commodities/countries that move firms away 
from their core of competitiveness. The direction of the effects depend on the market 
specialization of the whether the Bulgarian MPFs, that is, EU markets or Non-EU markets. 
Higher marginal costs might offset to a certain degree the positive effect of depreciation on 
prices when MPFs export to Non-EU countries. The opposite is found when MPFs specialize 
in exporting to EU countries. 
Thirdly, we also shed light of the cannibalization effect. We find that except for the 
MPFs that specialize in EU markets, increases in a firm’s total output have a negative effect 
of the export volume of each variety reflecting the cannibalization effect. This is because a 
larger output of one variety tends to lower the prices that consumers are willing to pay for all 
other varieties. When MPFs internalize demand linkages between the varieties they produce, 
MPFs will have enough incentives to restrict their output of each variety beyond the familiar 
own-price effect. Thus, when MPFs decide to produce less of every good, we say that there is 
a cannibalization effect. This result applies to our groups of all MPFs in aggregate, MPFs 
exporting to both EU and Non-EU markets, and MPFs exporting only to Non-EU markets. 
Firms exporting exclusively to EU markets, again, do not experience such cannibalization 
effect. These firms must be the more productive as they produce more in response to 
exchange rate depreciation, and even when they face higher marginal costs and when they 
increase their total production in all its varieties. Regarding prices, there are here evidences 
that prices decrease as a result of a cannibalization effect. This result applies to MPFs 
considered as a whole, the MPFs that specializes in exporting to both EU and Non-EU 
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markets, and the MPFs that export uniquely to EU markets. Therefore, cannibalization 
reduces the positive effect that real depreciations in the exchange rate have on prices, making 
the degree of pass-through smaller than otherwise. Thus, these types of MPFs absorb part of 
the costs of the cannibalization after letting real exchange rate depreciations increase the 
prices they can charge.  
Our study has shed light on the heterogeneous response to exchange rate movements, 
increases in marginal costs that result from increasing the number of product varieties, and 
the cannibalization effects among MPFs and between MPFs and SPFs. This has important 
implications for policy makers when deciding on exchange rate policies on the aggregate 
export sector. It is then crucial to take into account that the effects will not be uniform across 
industries and firm types. Another inference is that, following our findings that Bulgarian 
exporters seem to compete on productivity if they export to EU markets, and cost/price if 
they export to Non-EU markets. Policymakers could perhaps implement policies that give 
incentives to firms to reduce their costs and increase their productivity especially when their 
target is Non-EU markets. It is important here to remember that some of these costs may 
include the exchange rate risks. We have indeed found that MPFs benefit from exporting in 
EU markets by becoming more productive and encouraged to exporting more varieties while 
beating down the costs of producing these new varieties and the cannibalization effect. It is 
possible that these latter MPFs are in advantage as a result of facing lower exchange rate 
costs and being better exposed to the acquisition of know-how and technology from 
participating in EU markets. MPFs exporting to Non-EU markets may not be having the 
same experience.  
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Table 2. Export Volume: All firms. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at 
the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                            All Firms  All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms 
            Volume qijk           Volume qijk   Volume qijk Volume qijk Volume qijk Volume qijk 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln(gdp(t))                0.6093***   0.5916***   0.5982*** 0.5962***  0.5841*** 0.5506*** 
                 (0.1227)   (0.0037)    (0.0032) (0.0037)  (0.0018)  (0.0038) 
 
ln(1+ #countries(t)×               -0.0028 
#varieties(t))×ln(RER(t)               (0.0266)                
               
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×                  0.0516***     
#EUvarieties (t))×ln(RER(t))                  (0.0234)      
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                 -0.2265***      
#NonEUvarieties (t))×ln(RER(t))                  (0.0280)    
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties (t))×        0.0857***    
ln(RER(t))         (0.0157) 
   
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×       -0.1262 ***   
ln(RER(t))         (0.0171) 
 
(Deviation from             0.1575***     0.0944*** 
EUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))            (0.0258)   (0.0197) 
   
(Deviation from            -0.0051      -0.1631*** 
NonEUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))          (0.0407)    (0.0315) 
 
Volume qj×ln(RER(t))          -0.0492*** -0.0690*** 
            (0.0133)  (0.0180) 
 
ln(RER(t))    -0.0486           0.5345***     0.0949***   0.6472***  0.4867*** 0.4214*** 
                                            (0.1227)       (0.1000)    (0.0547)  (0.1710) (0.1637)  (0.2556) 
 
 
Number of Observations                           796,687 
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Table 3. Export Volume: ALL Multi-Product Firms (MPFs) and ALL Single-Product Firms (SPFs). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
MPFs               MPFs              MPFs                MPFs              MPFs              MPFs       SPFs             SPFs               
                    Volume qijk       Volume qijk      Volume qijk      Volume  qijk   Volume  qijk       volume  qijk    Volume qijk        Volume qijk  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ln(gdp(t))               0.6155***       0.6023***      0.5546***    0.5800*** 0.5652***       0.5174***       0.5332***  0.5270***   
               (0.0041)          (0.0044)     (0.0034)              (0.0022) (0.0018)          (0.0040)       (0.0041)          (0.0069) 
 
ln(1+ #countries(t)×             -0.1446***                                            -0.1966*** 
#varieties(t))×ln(RER(t))             (0.0502)                                       (0.0478) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×                        0.2839***                                0.0307*** 
#EUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                       (0.0927)                             (0.0132) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                      -0.4640***                            -0.2102*** 
#NonEUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                        (0.0750)                             (0.0284) 
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×         0.0252 
ln(RER(t))          (0.0161) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×       -0.3582***  
ln(RER(t))          (0.0292) 
 
(Deviation from            0.2016***             0.0708***  
EUcore(t))×ln(RER(t))          (0.0246)            (0.0229) 
 
(Deviation from                        -0.0097            -0.1173***  
NonEUcore(t))×ln(RER(t))         (0.0366)            (0.0349) 
 
Volume qj×ln(RER(t))                    -0.0516***      -0.0697*** 
           (0.0126)           (0.0190) 
 
ln(RER(t))                0.8024***      0.8558***       0.6937***     0.9567*** 0.4982***        0.4612***     0.6802***        0.3544***       
             (0.2616)          (0.3017)      (0.0771)             (0.1475)            (0.1532)           (0.2784)     (0.1896)      (0.0758)      
 
Number of Observations        741,456           55,231 
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Table 4. Export Volume: MPFs exporting to both EU and NonEU countries. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                     U+NonEU          EU+NonEU      EU+NonEU        EU+NonEU           EU+NonEU       EU+NonEU            
        Volume  qijk      Volume qijk    Volume qijk         Volume qijk          Volume qijk   Volume qijk  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln(gdp(t))            0.5873***      0.6003***              0.5848***            0.2432***          0.5836***   0.5825***          
           (0.0025)   (0.0035)                 (0.0024)                (0.1150)          (0.0022)          (0.0023) 
 
ln(1+ #countries(t)×        -0.2101*** 
#varieties(t))×ln(RER(t))        (0.0501)                
                
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×                   0.0922***                        
#EUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                 (0.0340)                         
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                  -0.2244***                   
#NonEUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                  (0.0392)                    
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×                       0.0631***                
ln(RER(t))                       (0.0242)                 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×                     -0.1811*** 
ln(RER(t))                       (0.0236) 
 
(Deviation from                      0.0488***    0.0525*** 
EUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))                    (0.0170)    (0.0221) 
 
(Deviation from                      0.0177                -0.0718*** 
NonEUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))                    (0.0265)                 (0.0213) 
 
Volume qj                              -0.0560***              -0.0471*** 
                               (0.0173)              (0.0176)  
 
ln(RER(t))         0.9732***          0.5344***             0.3208***        0.2432***            0.7084***   0.5123***        
              (0.2436)       (0.1641)                 (0.0925)        (0.1150)          (0.2233)                    (0.2011) 
 
 
Number of Observations   512,405       
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Table 5. Export Volume: MPFs exporting only to EU countries; and MPFs exporting only to Non-EU countries. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
 
                      EU       EU        EU             EU     EU                   NonEU        NonEU     NonEU        NonEU       NonEU 
             Volume qijk  Volume qijk  Volume qijk  Volume qijk   Volume qijk    Volume qijk  Volume qijk Volume qijk Volume qijk Volume qijk 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln(gdp(t))      0.5811***   0.5955***    0.5686***  0.5395*** 0.4571***      0.6298*** 0.6131***  0.6562***  0.6033***  0.6396*** 
      (0.0122)       (0.0116)   (0.0122)      (0.0138)       (0.0368)          (0.0157) (0.0144)      (0.0139)      (0.0119)  (0.0178) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×     -0.0624        
#EUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))  (0.5234)  
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                                 -0.0944 
#NonEUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                                  (0.0671) 
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×              0.1415***                                     
ln(RER(t))            (0.0682)                     
 
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×                            -0.1215 
ln(RER(t))                   (0.0733) 
 
(Deviation from                    0.8848***   0.8207*** 
EUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))     (0.0307)  (0.1765) 
 
(Deviation from                  -0.4109***   0.3195***  
NonEUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))                (0.0439)   (0.0440) 
 
Volume qj                 0.9065***  0.4047***                   -0.0680*** 0.1220***
                        (0.0458) (0.0841)                (0.0262)   (0.0226) 
                    
ln(RER(t))                             0.1195        -0.3062   2.2337           -1.5740       -1.5993             0.7619**      0.5903 *     0.9651***  0.8280**   0.9007*** 
                                              (0.2379)      (0.1987)  (2.1352)         (1.5058)      (1.4109)           (0.4078)        (0.3701)    (0.2590)     (0.3519)  (0.4477)
  
 
 
Number of Observations   213,493        70,789 
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Table 6. Export Volume: MPFs by size of their export volume. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
            Below 25  percentile   25 – 50 percentile   75 – 95 percentile     75 – 95 percentile   95 – 99 percentile 99 – 99.8 percentile 
             Volume qijk   Volume qijk      Volume qijk             Volume qijk   Volume qijk        Volume qijk  
ln(gdp(t))       0.1309***  0.3088***                  0.5031***               0.5197***               0.7698 ***  0.9761*** 
       (0.0077)  (0.0034)                      (0.0036)              (0.0030)                 (0.0089)                           (0.0062) 
  
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×      -0.1005***  0.0340         0.0481*               0.0584***    0.1580***  0.2297*** 
#commod(t))×ln(RER(t))     (0.0300)                (0.0294)                      (0.0284)              (0.0159)                 (0.0300)              (0.0969) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×  0.0396**  -0.0719***                -0.0899***              -0.0953***              -0.2424***                      -0.3831*** 
#commod(t))×ln(RER(t))  (0.0208)   (0.0231)        (0.0211)              (0.0214)                  (0.0506)              (0.1002)            
  
ln(RER(t))        0.2613*      0.2490***        0.1360***                0.1230*                    0.5965***               0.1704 
          (0.1513)             (0.1113)        (0.0731)               (0.0760)                  (0.1436)              (0.3036) 
 
# of Observations                203,117   195,276         199,120              159,321      32,620   5,756 
 
Table 7. Export Volume: MPFs by industry SITC6, SITC7, SICT8, SICT0, SITC5, SITC2 and SITC3. The coefficients in 
red bold are statistically insignificant at any reasonable level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
          SITC6:           SITC7: machinery,  SITC8: misc.    SITC0: food,        SITC5:         SITC2: crude  SITC3:mineral 
            Manufacturing     transport equip.    manufacturing   live animals    chemical prod.     Materials     fuels, lubricant. 
Volume qijk             Volume qijk      Volume qijk       Volume qijk      Volume qijk       Volume qijk      Volume qijk 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln(gdp(t))    0.5979***                    0.5616***            0.5082***       0.4894***     0.7273***  0.8618***  0.9491***
    (0.0077)                  (0.0062)               (0.0066)             (0.0049)    (0.0167) (0.0299)               (0.0278) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×    -0.0278            0.0498**          -0.0522***       0.2448***     0.1914*** -0.1152              -0.0058 
#commod(t))×ln(RER(t))   (0.0253)          (0.0258)          (0.0152)       (0.0341)    (0.0714) (0.0987)               (0.0253) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×   -0.3542***           -0.1579***           -0.2533***       -0.2991***    -0.3002***  0.0726              -0.1519  
#commod(t))×ln(RER(t))   (0.0696)           (0.0486)               (0.0256)       (0.0360)    (0.1166) (0.0859)              (0.0987) 
 
ln(RER(t))     0.9475***                     0.2850*                0.9885***       0.9755***     0.7664*  0.4676*               0.6514** 
 (0.1988)                      (0.1598)                (0.0871)          (0.2283)    (0.4575) (0.2727)              (0.3293) 
 
Number of Observations  176,268                  183,469          233,580        101,742     54,230  27,276  2,925 
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Table 8. Export Unit Price: All firms. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant 
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                         All Firms  All Firms        All Firms     All Firms         All Firms 
           Price pijk  Price pijk              Price pijk Price pijk      Price pijk    
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
 
ln(gdp(t))           0.1527***    0.1523***            0.1534***    0.1525***         0.1293*** 
                         (0.0019)   (0.0019)         (0.0019)         (0.0016)      (0.0050) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×          0.0224***             
#EUvarieties(t))           (0.0082)            
×ln(RER(t)) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                      -0.0571***              
#NonEUvarieties(t))                        (0.0125)             
×ln(RER(t)) 
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×               0.0314 ***                                         
ln(RER(t))               (0.0087)       
   
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×           -0.0938 ***        
ln(RER(t))               (0.0142)       
 
(Deviation from                              0.0213***                    0.0567***       
EUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))                    (0.0096)         (0.0137)      
   
(Deviation from                                  0.0023                   -0.0030          
NonEUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))                    (0.0155)                 (0.0210)          
 
 
Volume qj                              -0.0296***                      -0.0563***  
                        (0.0083)                      (0.0228) 
 
ln(RER(t))            0.2905***      0.3293***     0.2517***            0.5565***          0.8019* 
                                                   (0.0346)                  (0.0340)    (0.0701)           (0.1006)          (0.4559) 
 
Number of Observations                           796,687 
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Table 9. Export Unit Price: ALL MPFs and ALL SPFs. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent 
level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                             MPFs           MPFs         MPFs        MPFs           MPFs   SPFs 
             Price pijk                  Price pijk      Price pijk         Price pijk              Price pijk          Price pijk    
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
 
ln(gdp(t))              0.1517***             0.1526***           0.1588*** 0.1517***        0.1594***    0.1309*** 
              (0.0019)                 (0.0019)         (0.0011)  (0.0935)       (0.0011)    (0.0117) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×             0.0210***                 -0.1168 
#EUvarieties(t))             (0.0087)                  (0.1082) 
×ln(RER(t)) 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×          -0.0663***                  0.5337*** 
#NonEUvarieties(t))            (0.0084)                 (0.1459) 
×ln(RER(t))  
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×            0.0221***        
ln(RER(t))            (0.0091) 
   
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×       -0.0667*** 
ln(RER(t))            (0.0082) 
 
(Deviation from                     0.0245***    0.0355***     
EUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))                (0.0121)   (0.0103) 
   
(Deviation from                     -0.0425***    -0.0538 
NonEUCore(t))×ln(RER(t))                 (0.0105)   (0.0344) 
 
Volume qj                     -0.0298*** -0.0455*** 
                            (0.0077) (0.0142) 
 
ln(RER(t))                0.3482***  0.3115***             0.1545***    0.5515***           0.7321***  -0.2827** 
                                          (0.0354)   (0.0327)           (0.0123)   (0.0935)  (0.1836)         (0.1464) 
 
Number of Observations        741,456           55,231 
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Table 10. Export Unit Price: MPFs exporting to both EU and NonEU countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                     EU+NonEU      EU+NonEU        EU+NonEU        EU+NonEU   EU+NonEU                 
         Price  pijk       Price pijk        Price pijk            Price pijk     Price pijk       
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ln(gdp(t))          0.1512***               0.1534***            0.1584***         0.1523***           0.1575*** 
                 (0.0022)                 (0.0019)                (0.0011)        (0.0019)          (0.0011) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×  0.0182 
#EUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))           (0.0110)                         
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)× -0.0175 
#NonEUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t)) (0.0106)                    
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×                0.0195***              
ln(RER(t))        (0.0096)                 
 
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×      -0.0022 
ln(RER(t))        (0.0096) 
 
(Deviation from                      0.0187***    -0.0120*** 
EUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))                    (0.0097)    (0.0075) 
 
(Deviation from                      -0.0078     0.0072 
NonEUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))                   (0.0140)    (0.0115) 
 
Volume qj                   -0.0411***  -0.0261*** 
                    (0.0108)  (0.0103) 
 
ln(RER(t))           0.1595***            0.1124***               0.1873***          0.6626***    0.4472*** 
       (0.0488)         (0.0390)                   (0.0733)          (0.1381)             (0.1246) 
 
 
Number of Observations   512,405       
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Table 11. Export Unit Price: MPFs exporting only to EU countries; and Firms exporting only to Non-EU countries. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at 
the 10 percent level. 
 
                         EU        EU           EU                  EU               NonEU             NonEU     NonEU          NonEU 
        Price pijk     Price pijk     Price pijk      Price pijk          Price pijk            Price pijk        Price pijk         Price pijk   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln(gdp(t))               0.0828***     0.0820***   0.1697***      0.1930***      0.1405***         0.1376***      0.1408*** 0.1327*** 
                (0.0189)              (0.0189)       (0.0068)       (0.0077)          (0.0050)         (0.0069)     (0.0064)          (0.0067) 
 
ln(1+ #EUcountries(t)×  0.0712***        
#EUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t)) (0.0296)  
 
ln(1+ #NonEUcountries(t)×                                 0.0022  
#NonEUvarieties(t))×ln(RER(t))                                 (0.0218)  
 
ln(1+ #EUvarieties(t))×     0.0731***                                     
ln(RER(t))     (0.0295)                     
 
ln(1+ #NonEUvarieties(t))×                                  -0.0401 
ln(RER(t))                         (0.0263) 
 
(Deviation from                       0.0178     0.1082*** 
EUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))            (0.0422)    (0.0562) 
 
(Deviation from                      0.0352  0.0020 
NonEUCore(t)×ln(RER(t))               (0.0243) (0.0372) 
 
Volume qj            -0.0549***       0.0524***
                         (0.0252)      (0.0148) 
                    
ln(RER(t))                0.7520***      0.7618***     0.1814***       0.7453***     0.2340***        0.2551***       0.1477*** -0.4779*** 
             (0.2120)   (0.2079)         (0.0600)     (0.2807)         (0.0904)         (0.1074)            (0.0559)          (0.1633) 
 
 
Number of Observations   213,493        70,789 
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